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Abstract Whenever the economic model of behavior is to be applied, the utility
function has—at least somewhat—to be specified. Buchanan generally prefers to
apply a rather narrow version. However, he acknowledges that it is hardly possible
to explain actual behavior of individuals with such a version, so in performing
empirical economic research he accepts that we have to use a more open one. He
also acknowledges that people might behave differently in markets than they do in
politics; other-regarding behavior might be more pronounced in politics as com-
pared to markets. Which version should be applied in constitutional economics,
however, is a different question. Following a long ongoing tradition in political
philosophy, he insists that—for methodological reasons—the narrow version is the
correct one to be applied; this is the way to compare different sets of rules when
analyzing the possible abuse of power by rulers in order to prevent it as far as
possible. The same should also be taken into account when analyzing the process of
policy advice. The narrow homo oeconomicus model should, however, not be
misunderstood as a normative prescription.
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1 Introduction
Economists traditionally explain human behavior (or acting) as utility maximization
under constraints. Looking at it in more detail, there are (at least) four elements
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involved in this approach. The first one is methodological individualism, i.e. the
presupposition that only individuals act; there is no collective actor (in the strong
sense). Collective acting is derived from the actions of individuals.1 The second
element is the (weak) rationality principle: people have intentions and some
perceptions of their possibilities of action, and they choose those actions which
come closest to their intentions.2 The third element is assumptions about the
concrete intentions, or, to express it in economic terms, assumptions about the
content of the utility function. The last element is assumptions about the
informational situation of the acting individuals.
Undisputed in economics are both the principle of methodological individualism
and the weak rationality principle. Depending on the informational assumptions,
economic models usually employ rather strong versions of the rationality principle,
the extreme being the von-Neumann-Morgenstern concept of subjective expected
utility maximization.3 Thus, whether individuals really behave ‘rationally’ in the
strong sense is often questioned, whether by the theory of bounded (or procedural)
rationality by Simon (1955, 1978) or by experimental results in modern behavioral
economics. The content of the utility function is also debated; it might be relatively
open or restricted to pure-wealth maximization. In any event there are two questions
to be decided: (1) Is the individual only self- or also other-regarding? (2) Does the
utility function only contain ‘economic’ elements or does it contain other elements
(or values) as well?
In discussing these questions, Buchanan mainly dealt with the second one. Aside
from his elaboration of the ‘veil of uncertainty’ in constitutional analyses,4 in his
writings he mostly refers to the motivational assumptions. Thus in discussing
Buchanan’s position with respect to the economic model of behavior, in the
following we will restrict ourselves to this problem.
Depending on how these questions are answered and which assumptions are
made, the literature is populated with many different examples of homo
oeconomicus. Which one is appropriate depends very much on the purpose of the
model; for example: is it to explain the actual behavior of economic agents or is it to
make institutional comparisons? But even in restricting oneself to explaining actual
behavior, for instance, different versions might well be deemed appropriate
depending on the institutional setting in which individuals act, for example, in
politics versus the marketplace.
When we try to answer the question as to which role the model of homo
oeconomicus plays in Buchanan’s work, we must first of all take into account his
distinction between the constitutional level, where rules are set, and the sub-
constitutional level, where we behave according to specific rules that are already in
place. He used different terminologies in denoting these. In his early writings, he
called the first one ‘political economy’ and the second one ‘economics’ or ‘positive
1 On methodological individualism, for example, see Watkins (1958), but also Buchanan and Tullock
(1962: Chapter 2, 16ff.) as well as Buchanan (1979a: 48f.; 1987a: 244f; 1989: 55ff.).
2 On the weak rationality principle, see Kirchga¨ssner (2013).
3 For example, see Schoemaker (1982).
4 In particular, see Buchanan and Tullock (1962: 78ff.).
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economics’.5 He was mainly interested in the former, which he considered the more
important one.6 In his later writings he called it ‘constitutional economics’ or
‘constitutional political economy’.7 Let us continue to employ this terminology but
call the other one, as far as it relates to political processes, ‘public choice’. That
(empirical) public choice became part of the Virginia School of Political Economy
was, as Buchanan (1992: 54ff.) himself wrote, mainly the merit of Gordon Tullock.
In the following, we first ask which variant of the homo oeconomicus model
should be applied in empirical economic research, including empirical public choice
(Sect. 2). There might be, however, some differences in terms of whether this model
is to be applied to behavior in markets or in political processes, even if we do not
assume that people change their character whenever they switch from one to the
other area. Then we discuss the role of the homo oeconomicus model in
constitutional economics (Sect. 3). Another question, also highly relevant, is which
variant should be applied in analyzing the process of political advice, be it on the
sub-constitutional or constitutional level (Sect. 4). Buchanan’s views of this process
are rather normative, and he demands highly moral behavior on the part of the
political advisor. Nevertheless, in the spirit of the public choice approach, we should
also follow a positive approach and apply the model of homo oeconomicus not only
with respect to politicians but also with respect to their advisors. Normative
problems, which might be connected with applications of the homo oeconomicus
model, are also discussed by Buchanan (Sect. 5). There do exist some problems, but
their existence hardly justifies abandoning this model. We will then conclude with
some remarks on the attacks of contemporary behavioral economics on the homo
oeconomicus model (Sect. 6). These attacks may have relevance for empirical
economic (and political) research but hardly any for application of the homo
oeconomicus model in constitutional economics.
2 Which homo oeconomicus?
As mentioned above, when using the economic approach to explain human
behavior, one of the crucial questions is how to specify the utility function. The
basic problem here is the trade-off between applicability on the one hand and
explanatory power on the other. Leaving the utility function completely open (and
without specifying the information that an individual has), every facet of economic
behavior might be explained ex post facto as the result of rational decisions. But
then the predictive power tends towards zero; nothing can be excluded ex ante. On
the other hand, narrowly specifying the utility function by restricting its elements to
monetary wealth which is to be maximized, implies high predictive power, but will
often fail to explain actual behavior, is it in markets or politics.
5 For example, see Buchanan (1959, 1982a).
6 For example: ‘‘The task of economic theory is not that of predicting specific patterns of behavior, it is
that of providing a structural understanding of the processes within which the divergent behavioral plans
of persons are integrated and reconciled.’’ (Buchanan 1976: 127).
7 For example, see Buchanan (1987b) as well as Brennan and Buchanan (1985).
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A terminological question is which variant of the economic model of behavior
should in fact be labeled ‘homo oeconomicus’. This question is answered in a
variety of ways by different authors. Homans, for example, calls the narrow version
the ‘old’ and the wider one the ‘new’ economic man:
The trouble with him was not that he was economic, that he used his resources
to some advantage, but that he was antisocial and materialistic, interested only
in money and material goods, and ready to sacrifice even his old mother to get
them. What was wrong with him were his values: he was only allowed a
limited range of values; but the new economic man is not so limited. He may
have any values whatever, from altruism to hedonism, but so long as he does
not utterly squander his resources in achieving these values, his behavior is
still economic. In fact, the new economic man is plain man. (1961: 79f.)
Thus he obviously prefers to work with this ‘new’ version. Brennan and
Buchanan (1980: 19), on the other hand, seem to prefer a rather narrow (old) version
when they describe the homo oeconomicus as ‘‘the selfish brute who devotes
himself single-mindedly to maximizing the present value of his measurable
wealth.’’8
But even if it is generally necessary to clear up terminological questions in order
to avoid misunderstandings, the main problem is not one of terminology but which
variant of the economic model should be applied in which situations. In most of his
writings, Buchanan seems to prefer the narrow version often employed in economic
analyses, which he calls the ‘‘homo economicus of classical theory’’ or the ‘‘pure
economic man’’: ‘‘The pure economic man must behave so as to take more rather
than less when confronted with simple monetary alternatives. He must maximize
income-wealth and minimize outlays. He must maximize profits if he plays the role
of entrepreneur’’ (Buchanan 1969b: 38). For example he criticizes Alchian9 for
employing a completely open utility function and he demands use of a very
restrictive formulation that allows solely (traditional) economic (or financial)
arguments. ‘‘Alchian … along with many other economists, does not really want to
work within the constraints imposed by the homo economicus assumptions about
human motivation’’ (1979b: 130). Similarly, Brennan and Buchanan (1981: 157f.)
criticize Stigler (1982) because he attributes a descriptive value to the concept of
homo oeconomicus. Thus in this passage they defend the ‘old’ concept of economic
man in the sense of Homans (1961), whereas Stigler applies the new one.
On the other hand, Buchanan accepts that more general versions of the economic
model are possible: ‘‘In its most general (if empty) formulation the homo
economicus model presumes nothing beyond the proposition that each individual
acts purposefully in pursuit of his own particular ends; for some purposes at least,
the end can remain unspecified’’ (Brennan and Buchanan 1983: 89). He insists,
however, that three elements are necessary. First, referring to Wicksteed’s (1910:
8 See also the more drastic formulation: ‘‘to put my point differently but more dramatically, in some
aspects of their economic behavior, with appropriate qualifications, men are indeed like rats.’’ (Buchanan
(1982b: 35).).
9 He actually refers to the textbook by Alchian and Allen (1968).
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180) principle of ‘non-tuism’ he demands ‘‘that the relationship be economic, that
the interest of his opposite number in the exchange be excluded from consideration’’
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 17).10 Thus, he explicitly excludes altruism towards
those persons with whom one is in exchange from the analysis.11 Second, ‘‘the
average individual, when confronted with real choice in exchange, will choose
‘more’ rather than ‘less’’’ (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 17).12 Finally, he demands
that the utility function should contain at least one monetarily measurable element.
‘‘In its least restrictive formulation, the homo economicus construction requires only
that objectively measurable economic value, designated in monetary units, enter as
one argument in the representative person’s utility function’’ (Buchanan 1983: 116).
But this impact is not necessarily dominant: ‘‘There is no need to assign net wealth
or net income a dominating motivational influence on behavior in order to produce a
fully operational economic theory of choice behavior, in market or political
interaction’’ (Buchanan 1987a: 245). But he believes that these ‘economic’
arguments always play at least some role whenever individuals decide. ‘‘The
elementary fact is, of course, that homo economicus does exist in the human psyche,
along with many other men, and that behavior is a product of the continuing internal
struggle among these’’ (Buchanan 1976: 127).
He also acknowledges that the narrow model is hardly suitable for predictive
purposes, neither for economic nor for political analyses. In Buchanan (1983), for
example, he describes that the narrow version would easily allow for indications of
market as well as governmental failure; but while he has doubts as to the extent of
market-failure economics in the Pigouvian tradition detects, he expresses even more
doubts as to the validity of this approach in explaining political behavior, for in a
model applying this approach ‘‘voters do not vote; those that do are ill informed;
bureaucrats shirk their duties and use their discretionary powers to manipulate
budget sizes and budget compositions to their own advantage; elected politicians
seek to retain the perks of office and pander to the demands of minimally sized
constituencies necessary for re-election; judges enjoy the quiet life and spend little
time and effort in their duties’’ (p. 121).
10 See also Brennan and Buchanan (1981: 156).
11 Wicksteed (1910: 174ff.) does not generally exclude altruism from the individual’s motives in
economic transactions, but only that the individual does not ‘‘further the good of… the person with whom
he is dealing.’’ The individual might further the good of all other people in the world. Therefore, ‘‘The
specific characteristic of an economic relation is not its ‘egoism,’ but its ‘non-tuism’.’’ (p. 180). Buchanan
and Tullock (1962: 17) and in particular Brennan and Buchanan (1981) are more restrictive: ‘‘Homo
economicus, by construction, is not predicted to act other than in furtherance of his interests, vis-a`-vis that
of his trading cohort, as he evaluates such interest at the moment in choice.’’ They explicitly exclude that
he is ‘‘influenced by ethical or moral considerations’’ (p. 156)—On the consideration of altruism in the
economic approach, referring to Andreoni (1988), see Kirchga¨ssner (2010).
12 See also Buchanan (1969a: 38). While this is a usual assumption in economic models and holds in
most real situations, it precludes that individuals deliberately restrict their leeway in terms of future
actions in order to improve their long-term well-being. In contrast to the remark by Buchanan and Tullock
(1962: 17), in the meantime there have not only been observations in this respect but there are also
theories which explain why in some situations individuals ‘‘will choose ‘less’ rather than more’.’’ For the
economic analysis of such situations see, for example, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) or Maital (1986).
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He does not believe in this caricature of the political world and comes, therefore,
to the following conclusion: ‘‘that neither markets nor politics can be appropriately
modelled in the strict formulation of the Homo economics construction. We must
reckon on other-than-economic arguments in individual utility functions, both in
market dealings and in political dealings. But we must also keep in mind that the
economic argument always remains in utility functions as an important and relevant
argument, in individual behavior, in markets and in politics. In a somewhat modest,
but surely defensible sense, we can say that the methodological lesson to be drawn
from Public Choice is nothing more than this admonition’’ (p. 122).
As mentioned above, to apply the concept of the ‘new’ economic man comes at a
cost: the leeway increases, but the predictive power or informational content
decreases; more behavior is compatible with the economic model of behavior, but
less behavior can be excluded.13 Brennan and Buchanan (1983, 1985) are well
aware of this trade-off and generally weight the loss of predictive power more
greatly than the wider range of possible applications. On the other hand, when he
wants to explain something Buchanan (1979b: 138), admits that he is ‘‘quite willing
to fall back on the extended utility function … to assist me in explanation.’’ But he
does not need such assistance too often because, as mentioned in the introduction,
he is much more interested in constitutional questions than in explaining actual
behavior.
Buchanan also acknowledges that people might behave quite differently in
different environments, and therefore differently in markets as opposed to politics,
these institutions providing quite different incentives.14 He insists, however, that the
same and not different human beings are acting in these environments, and that the
same basic model should therefore be applied, at least so long as we possess no better
alternative. It is first of all a question of consistency: ‘‘There is at least a strong
presumption that individuals do not undergo character transformation when they
shift from roles as buyers or sellers in the market-place to roles as voters, taxpayers,
beneficiaries, politicians, or bureaucrats in the political process’’ (1987b: 587).
Brennan and Buchanan call this the symmetry argument. It does not necessarily
imply that the homo oeconomicus model is the appropriate one for analyzing human
behavior: ‘‘The symmetry argument suggests only that whatever model of behavior is
used, that model should be applied across all institutions. The argument insists that it
is illegitimate to restrict homo economicus to the domain of market behavior while
employing widely different models of behavior in nonmarket settings, without any
coherent explanation of how such a behavioral shift comes about’’ (1985: 57).
Consequently, Buchanan does ‘‘not want to enter into either a defense of or an attack
on the usefulness of homo economicus in economics or in any theory of politics.’’
According to him, ‘‘the burden of proof should rest with those who suggest that
wholly different models of man apply in the political and the economic realms of
behavior. Logical consistency suggests that, at least initially, we examine the
implications of using the same models in different settings’’ (1979a: 49).
13 See Popper (1935: 84ff.) with reference to Carnap (1932: 458).
14 See also Buchanan (1954).
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3 The role of homo oeconomicus in constitutional economics
The question as to which version of the homo oeconomicus model is appropriate
when it comes to constitutional economics demands a separate answer. In
explaining actual behavior, unrealistic assumptions about human behavior must
not necessarily but can indeed lead to false predictions and, therefore, not only lead
to the falsification of a theory but also make it useless for practical (political)
purposes. Thus one might discuss how realistic the economic model must be,
depending on the concrete situation to be explained, and how far the abstractions
might sensibly go.15 But the situation is quite different as soon as we turn to
constitutional questions: ‘‘Homo economicus, the individual who populates the
models of empirical economics may, but need not, describe the individual whose
choice calculus is analyzed in constitutional political economy. When selecting
among alternative constitutional constraints, however, the individual is required to
make some predictions about the behavior of others than him. And, in such a setting
there is a powerful argument that suggests the appropriateness of something akin to
the Homo economicus postulate for behavior’’ (Buchanan 1990: 15).16
Thus in constitutional economics it is clear from the beginning that the homo
oeconomicus is an abstract model to analyze the possible effects of different
(constitutional) rules once they come into effect.17 Consequently, Brennan and
Buchanan (1981) ‘‘offer a methodological, rather than a predictive (’scientific’)
defense’’ of the homo oeconomicus approach in this field: ‘‘Simply put, our claim is
that homo economicus rightly belongs in the analytical derivation of normative
propositions about appropriate institutional design. In other words, the model of
human behavior that we might properly use in choosing among alternative
institutions may be different from the model that would be more appropriate in
making predictions about behavior within existing institutional structures’’ (p. 159).
Or to put another way: ‘‘Our use of [the narrow version of] Homo economicus stems
from our conviction that this model is the most appropriate one for constitutional
analysis’’ (Brennan and Buchanan 1983: 55).
With this argument, Buchanan (together with Brennan) stands in a long tradition
of political philosophy. More than two-hundred years before, David Hume (1741:
42f.) wrote:
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system
of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution,
every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his
actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by
means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition,
15 On the role of ‘unrealistic’ assumptions in economic analyses, see the seminal contribution of
Friedman (1953).
16 There he argues, of course, for the very narrow version of the homo oeconomicus model and not for
one of its extended forms which might be applied in empirical analyses. See also Brennan and Buchanan
(1983: 90): ‘‘… that the Homo economicus model of human behavior may be superior in comparative
institutional analysis to a more ‘accurate’ model of human behavior in the conventional predictive sense’’.
17 For example, see Buchanan (1987c: 10ff.).
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co-operate to public good. Without this, say they, we shall in vain boast of the
advantages of any constitution, and shall find, in the end, that we have no
security for our liberties or possessions, except the good-will of our rulers; that
is, we shall have no security at all. It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that
every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the same time, it appears
somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in
fact.18
Brennan and Buchanan (1981: 164) also cite John Stuart Mill in making the
following point:
the very principle of constitutional government requires it to be assumed that
political power will be abused to promote the particular purposes of the
holder; not because it is always so, because such is the natural tendency of
things to guard against which is the special use of free institutions.19
And similar arguments can be found in Karl Popper’s Open Society when he
describes the relevant problem of political economy (or philosophy):
… that it is not at all easy to get a government on whose goodness and wisdom
one can implicitly rely. If that is granted, then we must ask whether political
thought should not face from the beginning the possibility of bad government;
whether we should not prepare for the worst leaders, and hope for the best. But
this leads to a new approach to the problem of politics, for it forces us to
replace the question: Who should rule? by the new question: How can we so
organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented
from doing too much damage? (Popper 1945: 121).
With their position, Brennan and Buchanan (1981) consider themselves ‘‘directly
within the tradition of classical political economy’’ (p. 163) because: ‘‘The purpose
for which homo economicus was used in classical political economy was largely that
of comparing the properties of alternative socioeconomic arrangements (constitu-
tions) and not that of explaining ‘scientifically’ (making predictions about) the
behavior of economizing actors’’ (p. 156). They also refer to Smith (1759) who,
according to them, ‘‘makes it clear that homo economicus is not to be conceived as a
generalized description of human nature’’ (p. 163). And they defend themselves
against different critiques in the following way: ‘‘On empirical grounds, we are
surely closer to Adam Smith than our modern critiques, whichever side these
critiques come from. We admit freely the possibility and indeed the likelihood of
non-selfish behavior in all institutional settings. But, like Adam Smith, we believe
that homo economicus remains the appropriate model of behavior in the derivation
of normative propositions about the institutions themselves’’ (pp. 164f.).
Constitutional Economics follows, for good reasons, this tradition. There are,
however, some authors like, for example, Frey (1997) who argue that, when
deciding on a constitution, we should have more trust in the responsibility of the
18 Part of this passage is cited by him, for example, in Buchanan (1990: 11).
19 Mill (1861, Chapter XII: 217f.).
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individuals because otherwise civic virtues might be crowded out. This argument
has a valid core, but it applies much more to ordinary citizens than to politicians.
The leeway of ordinary citizens must also be restricted so as to allow for a well-
functioning instead of an anarchical society. Otherwise constitutions would be un-
necessary. On the other hand, without at least some moral behavior of the citizens
which can hardly be enforced by legal rules, neither our economic markets nor our
political democratic systems could lead to (more or less) satisfactory results.20 But
this holds (only) for situations where the potential for exploiting other citizens is
strongly limited, if present at all. Politicians and bureaucrats (rulers), on the other
hand, due to their powerful instruments, have much larger possibilities of exploiting
other people. Thus it is much more important to restrict their leeway in order to
prevent them from abusing their power. This again justifies the rather narrow
version of the economic model of behavior being applied in constitutional matters.
4 The economist as policy advisor
Policy advice is given by economists in terms of both current political processes and
at the constitutional level. Economists often pretend to behave like benevolent and
omniscient dictators while occupying this role, but in reality they are neither as
benevolent nor omniscient as they believe; they have only limited knowledge of
political and economic processes and, what is more important, they have their own
preferences which invariably have an impact on their recommendations.
At the sub-constitutional level the only information needed is that of positive
economics; the advisor should be able to correctly predict the results of proposed
policies. The lack of omniscience might, therefore, ‘only’ lead to wrong
recommendations; the results can be quite different from those predicted. This
might or might not be the advisors’ fault; depending on, for example, whether they
applied a non-appropriate model or whether events happened which could not be
predicted. As long as they only make conditional statements, their political
preferences should play a minor role, because they have a strong interest in making
correct predictions. Otherwise they would risk their reputation. The less unanimity
there is among economists about the effects to be expected from applying a specific
policy, the more room there will of course be for private political preferences to
enter into the economists’ recommendations, even if they only make if–then
statements.
The advisor’s task is much more difficult at the constitutional level. Here the
advisor not only has to know the functioning of all possible worlds but also the
preferences of all individuals if he really wants—as traditional welfare economics
tries—to propose Pareto-improving measures. Buchanan (1959) strongly criticizes
this habit. According to him, ‘‘This omniscience assumption seems wholly
unacceptable. Utility is measurable, ordinally or cardinally, only to the individual
decision maker.’’ As long as the ranking of alternatives cannot be revealed by
20 For example, see Kirchga¨ssner (2008: 121ff.; 2010).
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observing actions of individuals, even an independent observer ‘‘must remain
fundamentally ignorant concerning the actual ranking of alternatives’’ (p. 126).
Taking this into account, the task of an observer and his assessment of the
efficiency of different solutions ‘‘must be drastically modified.… The observer may
introduce an efficiency criterion only through his own estimate of his subjects’ value
scales. Hence, the maximization criterion which the economist may employ is
wholly in terms of his own estimate of the value scales of individuals other than
himself. Presumptive efficiency is, therefore, the appropriate conception for political
economy’’ (p. 126).
At this point, Buchanan makes strong moral demands on the political advisor.
The ideal advisor ‘‘accepts these [the citizens’] preferences as he thinks they exist.
He does not evaluate social alternatives on the basis of individual preferences as he
thinks they should be.’’ Thus, ‘‘the characteristic behavior of the political economist
is, or should be, ethically neutral’’ (p.127). One can, of course, demand such
behavior, but we can hardly assume that this ideal situation is the regular case. To
assume the latter is to forget that even (constitutional) economists, as political
advisors, are homines oeconomici with their own political preferences.21
Buchanan first circumvents this problem by assuming that decisions (at the
constitutional stage) are being made unanimously. Those who are advised have to
accept the economist’s proposals and they rarely ask for the advisor’s preferences.
This would also circumvent the second problem, not discussed in Buchanan (1959),
that individual preferences cannot be compared. He justifies this by having
‘‘assumed that the social group is composed of reasonable men, capable of
recognizing what they want, of acting on this recognition, and of being convinced of
their own advantage after reasonable discussion.’’ He is, however, ‘‘aware of the
limitations of this conception of society’’. ‘‘Insofar as ‘antisocial’ or unreasonable
individuals are members of the group, consensus, even where genuine ‘mutual
gains’ might be present, may be impossible.’’ Thus, ‘‘some less definitive rule of
relative unanimity must be substituted for full agreement’’ (p. 134f.).
Buchanan is fully aware that this imposes an additional moral obligation on the
advisor; ‘‘it does place an additional responsibility upon the political economist. He
is forced to discriminate between reasonable and unreasonable men in his search for
consensus.’’ Buchanan believes that ‘‘this choice need not reflect the introduction of
personal evaluation’’ (p. 135). Despite the fact that he is qualifying this passage
somewhat, this is hardly plausible: the discrimination between reasonable and
unreasonable men necessarily implies a personal evaluation. And on this the
political preferences of the advisor will have a distinctive impact.
Buchanan hopes to mitigate this problem somewhat by referring to the role of
political discussion, but he also recognizes that this is not a panacea for achieving
consensus, not even among ‘reasonable men’. He nevertheless hopes that such
discussions might change preferences. ‘‘The purpose of political discussion is
precisely that of changing ‘tastes’ among social alternatives.’’ But this places once
again additional moral burdens on the advisor: ‘‘The political economist, therefore,
21 In terms of Rawls (1971), one might say that Buchanan (1959) developed an ‘ideal theory’ at this
point, and the realistic theory is still yet to take shape.
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in constructing and applying his presumptive efficiency criterion, must try to
incorporate the predicted preferences of individuals, not as they exist at a given
moment, but as they will be modified after responsible discussion. In other words,
he must try to predict ‘what reasonable individuals will reasonably want’ after
discussion, not what they ‘do want in a given moment’ before discussion or what
they ‘ought to want’ if they agreed in all respects with the observer’’ (p. 136f).22
In concluding this paper, Buchanan once again denotes the moral obligation of
the advisor: ‘‘In all this, as an observer, he is ethically neutral. His own evaluations
of the alternatives considered do not, and should not, influence his behavior in any
way other than necessarily arising out of the membership in the group’’ [i.e. the
group for which he makes recommendations and of which he is a member] (p. 138).
Thus the role of the political advisor is one for which the model of homo
oeconomicus seems inappropriate; his own preferences should not count. As an
ethical demand this might be reasonable, but it is hardly acceptable for analyzing
the process of political advice, be it at the sub-constitutional or the constitutional
level. This is an ‘ideal theory’ assuming an ‘ideal human being’. In reality, however,
not only do economic agents and politicians have their own interests but so too
economists, even constitutional economists, and this holds true in particular
whenever they give political advice. It is of course not the crude model of homo
oeconomicus which in general correctly describes their behavior; in most cases the
advisors will not only have economic (financial) elements in their utility functions.
Here one should follow the recommendations of Buchanan (1983: 121f.) mentioned
above. But this does not imply that advisors are now the ‘saints’ that traditional
economic theory had often believed politicians to be. Thus when designing the
process of political advice, one might counterfactually apply the crude model
Brennan and Buchanan (1983) recommend for the application in constitutional
economics, because it could be fatal to confound self-interested policy advisors with
saints. Here the same arguments hold for policy advisors, wherever they might come
from, as for politicians. When analyzing the institutional framework of policy
advice the situation is the same as in constitutional economics: ‘‘the Homo
economicus model of human behavior may be superior … to a more ‘accurate’
model of human behavior in the conventional predictive sense; and that an attack on
the use of homo economicus… based solely on direct appeal to observation cannot
be decisive, and is largely misconceived’’ (p. 89).
5 On the normative use and abuse of homo oeconomicus
As any model of rational behavior, the model of homo oeconomicus can, at least in
one of its stronger versions, also be used for normative purposes. Buchanan (1969a:
49) states that ‘‘in effect, though perhaps inadvertently, the applied economists and
the welfare theorist alike accept the behavior of Homo economicus as a value
criterion.’’ Some but definitely not all applied economists and welfare theorists fall
22 Here he comes quite close to the consensus theory of truth as propagated, for example, by Habermas
(1971) or Apel and Kettner (1992).
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into this trap. Nevertheless one can easily find such situations, for instance,
whenever economists propose some political measures ‘for purely economic
reasons’. Buchanan explicitly rejects this normative use of homo oeconomicus and
calls it a fundamental error.
However, as suggested by Buchanan in many of his writings, there is another
‘normative’ problem in using the homo economicus in its narrow sense. By
explaining, for example, politicians as revenue maximizers (Leviathans) in the sense
of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) or bureaucrats as budget maximizers in the sense
of Niskanen (1971), such behavior might be considered as being justified. As
mentioned above and recognized by Buchanan (1983: 121f.), despite the fact that
they have incentives to behave according to these models, in reality most of these
individuals behave quite differently. Nevertheless, if these theories are taken as
justifications for behaving accordingly, people might change their behavior and act
less responsibly while still yet becoming more self-regarding than before. Such a
critique has, among others, been put forward by Gordon (1976) and Kelman (1987).
This critique must be taken seriously, as Brennan and Buchanan (1988) do.23
Their answer is threefold. First, one must distinguish between applications of the
model to markets and to politics. ‘‘In the context of well-functioning markets, this
prospect may be of little concern. Within the market, self-interested behavior, given
the appropriate legal constraints, does not necessarily inhibit ‘social interest’ and
may indeed further it. In this institutional setting, any legitimizing of self-interest
that economic theory provides need have no moral consequences of any
significance.’’ But this no longer holds as soon as this model—in empirical public
choice—is employed to explain the behavior of political actors, be they politicians,
bureaucrats, or voters. In such contexts, ‘‘any comparable response in the behavior
of political actors may be of considerable normative account’’ (p. 83).
A second answer is that this should give incentives to building up ‘good’
institutions, which for example prevent politicians and bureaucrats from abusing
their power. However, ‘‘as any good Public Choice theorist recognizes, some
discretionary political power will remain in the hands of some political agents even
under the best of feasible arrangements: constraints are costly, and we must make
the best of what we have’’ (p. 86).
Their third and main answer is, however, that such concerns are based on a
misunderstanding of the role of the homo oeconomicus in economic theory and in
constitutional economics in particular. As mentioned above, the model of ‘pure
economic man’ as employed in the latter can be justified if ‘‘we shift attention away
from the analysis of policy choices by existing agents within existing rules, and
towards the examination of alternative sets of rules’’ (p. 87). The purpose of such
exercises is, of course, not to advise politicians how to maximize social welfare but
to find rules which prevent as far as possible political (and economic) agents from
abusing their power.
23 There is a similar discussion on the role of economic education. As several studies show, economics
students seem to be more self-regarding and less other-regarding than students of other disciplines. The
question is whether this is due to training and/or self-selection. Probably both play a role. For example,
see Carter and Irons (1991), Kirchga¨ssner (2005) or Wang, Malhotra and Murnighan (2011).
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As correct as this answer is, it cannot of course prevent political agents from
using public choice theory as a legitimation of immoral behavior. This is surely not
the intention of constitutional economics, but such a misunderstanding could even
be used deliberately in order to justify behavior which violates common social
norms. But even if this is the case, such behavior of politicians and/or bureaucrats is
hardly sufficient to justify an abandonment of the homo oeconomicus model in
constitutional analyses as long as there is no substitute; a substitute that would fit at
least as well the purpose of deriving rules for efficiently constraining political actors
without restraining these to such a degree that they are no longer able to fulfil their
social role. One might even argue that such behavior makes employing the homo
oeconomicus model in such analyses even more necessary.
In contrast to others, Buchanan (1978) accepts that monetary considerations have
gained influence in recent decades. But he sees the reason for this not in the
increased role the economic model of behavior has played in recent decades not
only in economics but also in other social sciences; rather, he observes a general
decline of moral behavior and the diminished importance of stabilizing institutions.
He mentions several possible reasons for this, among them increased mobility or the
replacement of local with national markets and concludes: ‘‘Add to this the observed
erosion of the family, the church, and the law—all of which were stabilizing
influences that tended to reinforce moral precepts—and we really understand why
Homo economicus has assumed such a dominant role in modern behavior patterns’’
(p. 367).24 One can question whether the increased role of economic arguments and
the expansion of markets into areas that were regulated by other mechanisms before
are really indications of a general decline of moral behavior, but Buchanan is with
this assessment in line with quite a few (left-wing) authors who complain of the ever
increasing importance of (narrowly) economic considerations in our social life.25
6 Concluding remarks
Considering the very general version of the economic model of behavior, the utility
function is completely open and might contain any argument. But whenever this
model is applied, the utility function must be specified, at least to some degree.
Buchanan generally prefers applying a rather narrow version, ‘‘the selfish brute who
devotes himself single-mindedly to maximizing the present value of his measurable
wealth’’ (Brennan and Buchanan 1980: 19). However, he acknowledges that in
using this approach it is hardly possible to explain the actual behavior of
individuals, be it in the market or in politics. Thus, despite the fact that he criticizes
usage of the homo oeconomicus model as a descriptive one, he accepts that in
performing empirical economic research we have to use a more open version. He
also acknowledges that, due to various constraints, people might behave differently
24 See also the comparatively negative evaluation of the current moral situation in Buchanan (1976:
132f.).
25 See, for example, Saul (1995). – On the increased role of economic (financial) arguments and markets
in modern life and reasons for this, see, for example, Kirchga¨ssner (1997).
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in markets than in politics; other-regarding behavior might be more pronounced in
politics as compared to markets.
But the question as to which version should be applied must be answered quite
differently when we come to constitutional economics, the area in which Buchanan
is most interested. Following a long and ongoing tradition in political philosophy, he
insists that—for methodological reasons—the narrow version is the correct one to
be applied, because this is the way to compare different sets of rules when inquiring
into the possible abuse of power by rulers and how to prevent this as far as possible.
The same holds when analyzing the process of policy advice.
In recent years the homo oeconomicus model has come under severe attack by
behavioral economists. In particular they have criticized the concentration on self-
interest and on (exclusively) monetary arguments. In undertaking dictator-games,
ultimatum-games and public-good games they were able to show that—at least in
some situations—individuals are much less self-regarding and far more other-
regarding than traditional economic theory assumes.26 Moreover, Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) show that observable behavior in labor markets can only be explained if we
include relative income (relative to other workers in the same firm) in the utility
function.
All these recent critiques of the homo oeconomicus model, are they justified or
not, can be relevant for empirical economic and/or political research. This of course
also holds for empirical public choice. At the latest since Downs (1957), we have
been cognizant of the fact that the high participation rates we observe in elections
and referenda, for example, are incompatible with a narrow variant of the homo
oeconomicus model and particularly with a model allowing only for self-regarding
behavior.27 But these arguments do not relate to the application of this model in
constitutional economics, which, as mentioned above, can be justified for quite
other reasons than empirical applicability. Insofar, these arguments are hardly
relevant for Buchanan’s work.
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